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In this paper we study the properties of general equilibrium with default 
in economies with incomplete markets. It is noted that, in equilibrium, an 
agent makes two types of comparisons when deciding whether to participate 
in the credit market: as a lender and as a borrower. As a consequence, the 
equilibrium can be linked to levels of punishment, perception of default and 
promised returns. An analysis of equilibrium in the case of economies with 
two homogeneous types of agents is also presented, from which it can be 
deduced that in equilibrium under partial default the personal valuations 
of default for the buyer and the seller are equal.
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1.  Introduction
In recent years, the increasing role of capital markets has shown that 
default should not be underrated when evaluating the orderly functioning 
of markets. In this sense, the mere possibility or belief in its existence 
on the part of agents generates immediate effects on both asset prices 
as well as on the availability of credit, and may even have significant 
consequences on the agents’ consumption possibility set.
When asset markets are incomplete, as occurs in the real world, the 
lack of instruments in relation to possible future events prevents 
agents from allocating their resources efficiently based on their 
preferences and the objective probabilities of their occurrence. Given 
the impossibility of optimal risk diversification, the possibility of 
default, when predicted rationally, can contribute to reducing this 
scarcity. In fact, if agents assume a certain level of punishment for 
default, the quantity of assets would increase, since each agent could 
use one or more of them to build a “custom” instrument, each with 
its price and expected return.
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Dubey et al. (1989, 2000, 2005) and Zame (1993) introduced the idea 
of the possibility of default in a general equilibrium framework. These 
studies, as well as several subsequent ones (Zame and Geanakoplos, 
2000, Orillo, 2001a, Araujo et al., 2002 and Dubey et al., 2005 among 
otherssee references), prove the existence of equilibrium in this 
context. However, the demonstration of existence is insufficient in 
itself for a deeper analysis of its properties. In this sense, a study of 
agents’ optimal individual decision in equilibrium would contribute 
to the search for qualitative conclusions more general than those 
presented in the numerical examples contained in some of the 
aforementioned papers.
Keeping in mind this consideration, an analysis of the properties of 
general equilibrium with default is presented.
1.1.  Main results
The proposed description of general equilibrium with default with 
incomplete markets enables us to analyze qualitatively the properties 
of agents’ optimal individual decision. Without the technical difficulty 
of having to deal with an optimization problem which involves a non-
differentiable objective function, the equilibrium analysis shows that 
an agent makes two types of comparisons when making a decision 
regarding an operation that involves a financial instrument: one as a 
buyer of assets and another as a seller of assets. In the first case, the 
agent compares the price to the valuation of the total effective asset 
returns, while in the second case, for the valuation of the returns only the 
promised returns are considered, independent of their effective fulfillment. 
Regardless of the equilibrium prices vector, if asset punishments differ 
from one another in a given state, a partial default equilibrium for 
an asset j implies that all assets with punishments greater than j will 
be fulfilled in that state while those with punishments lower than j 
will be fully defaulted.
The proposed characterization also allows us to analyze the relationship 
between buying and selling assets, punishments, promised payoffs and 
degree of fulfillment. In this sense, for the existence of equilibrium in 
asset markets it is necessary that the price of the asset be sufficiently 
low so that the buyer assumes the risk of default implied by its 
purchase. On the seller side, the price must be high enough to provide 
an incentive for taking the risk of a high punishment in the bad state. 1 E.A. Rodríguez | DEFAUlT IN ECoNoMIES WITH INCoMPlETE MARKETS
In equilibrium, if the transaction is carried out, the price will be 
equal to the buyer’s personal valuation of the portion of the returns 
that the asset effectively pays. It is definitely the buyer of the asset 
who ultimately sets the equilibrium price, independent of the seller’s 
personal valuations and promises.
An analysis for economies with two homogenous types of agents 
shows that if an Arrow asset is subject to partial default, the seller’s 
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution must be lower than the 
buyer’s, while if the promise is fulfilled, the seller’s rate must be 
equal to the buyer’s. These properties enable us to verify that, in 
equilibrium, levels of consumption and default must be such that the 
personal valuations of the default degree of the asset are equal for 
the buyer and seller. It is also shown that, in this context, situations 
of total and partial fulfillment of payments are compatible with finite 
punishment rates.
1.2.  General context and related work
The possibility of default, that is, unfulfillment of a contract, used to 
be associated with the idea of disequilibrium. The fact that one of the 
sides of the contract does not deliver the good or goods promised in 
a given state hinders the fulfillment of the plans made by the other 
side. However, this relationship between default and disequilibrium 
is based on the assumption that both sides expect the contract to 
be fulfilled. If suddenly the side affected were to anticipate a certain 
degree of default, her plans could be based on this possibility. The 
idea of equilibrium, viewed as the compatibility of plans, thus begins 
to sound reasonable, despite the existence of default.
At the end of the 1980s, in a pioneering work, Dubey et al. (1989) 
took this idea much further, setting the discussion within a general 
equilibrium framework. The main conclusion of this work emphasized 
the fact that in an economy with incomplete financial markets, the 
intertemporal allocation of resources could be done more efficiently 
with the possibility of the existence of default than without it.
In an economy with incomplete financial markets, the possibility of 
increasing the efficiency of resource allocation is hindered by the lack 
of appropriate assets to hedge risk in a Pareto efficient way. Thus, it 
is possible that an agent who wants to allocate her resources in the 
desired way in one state is simultaneously making promises which are  LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48, No. 1 (MAY, 2011), 39–64
beyond their possibilities in another state. In a context in which there 
is no possibility of default, asset transactions may not be carried out. 
However, if the agent had the possibility of defaulting in those states 
in which she does not have sufficient resources to fulfill her obligations 
and if in addition, these have a low probability of occurrence, the asset 
transactions would be possible. If this happens, the efficiency can be 
increased because the impact of the agent’s loss of anticipated profit 
is smaller due to having assumed a low probability of occurrence of an 
adverse state, (Zame, 1993). Therefore, by simply facing a punishment, 
if it is not too high in comparison to the profits in terms of welfare, the 
agent may be better off defaulting on her obligation in the bad state 
than staying out of the market. Thus, the default becomes voluntary, 
depending on the punishment imposed on the side in default.
Clearly, in this situation there is an obvious problem: That which 
represents an improvement for one agent may represent a worsening 
for another. An agent who is able to carry out short sales without 
having to honor her debts and who can go as far into debt as she likes 
at current interest rates is the same as an agent without any budget 
constraints, so that the existence of individual equilibrium would be 
practically impossible.
1 Therefore, it is essential for the existence of 
the economic problem that some limitation be incorporated into the 
amount of credit an agent can obtain. This has been done explicitly, 
both exogenously by Dubey et al. (2005) by introducing the idea of 
“extension of credit,” and endogenously by Zame and Geanakoplos 
(2000) through the requirement of a durable good as collateral.
2
The models of equilibrium with default with incomplete markets do not 
differ substantially from the one presented originally in Dubey et al. 
(1989). Its central assumptions can be summarized as follows:
  Two-period economies: Time is divided into present and future. 
There is no possibility of restructuring defaulted obligations, 
because there is no further division of the period known as 
“future”
3. Generally, no discount factors are specified.
1. The only constraint an individual would face in this situation is the amount of total resources avail-
able in the economy, an event that the literature discards in equilibrium.
2. Maldonado and Orillo (2005) study the link between models with collateral and those with punish-
ment for default.
3. Orillo (2001) and Araujo et al. (2002) study the existence of equilibrium for agents with infinite 
horizon and commitments backed by collateral. Páscoa and Seghir (2003, 2009) incorporate punishments 
for default similar to those specified in Dubey et al. (1989, 2000, 2005). Within this scheme, Maldonado 
and Orillo (2003) analyze the problem of infinite horizon in a framework of overlapping generations. E.A. Rodríguez | DEFAUlT IN ECoNoMIES WITH INCoMPlETE MARKETS
  Extra-economic punishment: The only function of the 
punishment is to serve as an alternative to the cost which the 
agent must incur if a bad state is revealed. Thus, punishment 
does not have direct effects on the future participation of the 
defaulting side in the credit market. The magnitude of the 
punishment is a parameter which is exogenous to the model and 
only ensures that the agent fulfills her debt when she is able to 
do so. For simplicity’s sake, punishment is usually understood 
as linear and separable on the default amount.
  Expectations of default: The assets in this type of model are 
not only represented by their returns, but are also related to 
an expected degree of default. Thus an asset promises a certain 
payment in the event of a specific combination of states of nature 
and degrees of default. If some type of limitation is included, the 
asset will be identified with a 3-tuple. Equilibrium is reached 
assuming that the agents’ expectations are rational.
  Anonymous default: Markets are perfectly competitive, such that 
each agent sees that her actions have null effect on the aggregate 
default level. In fact, the assets are thought of as pools such that 
losses due to default are shared among those who possess the 
defaulted asset, and the default therefore has a limited impact 
among the agents. At no time does the owner of a defaulted asset 
know which agent defaulted. The only information available to 
the owner is the aggregate degree of default. Thus, an asset is 
defaulted but an agent is not a defaulter; in other words, there 
are no “defaulting persons,” instead there are “defaulted assets.”
  Single consumption good:
4 This assumption helps to simplify 
several issues, the most important being that exchange of goods 
makes no sense in the second period. Thus, demonstrations 
are simplified in a sensible way, even though it goes against a 
natural extension to economies of more than two periods, since 
in the latter case the assumption of non-exchange of goods 
in intermediate periods is highly unrealistic.
5 The technical 
4. This assumption often appears in the more basic models, not in the more sophisticated ones such as 
Geanakolos and Zame (2000) and those mentioned in the previous footnote.
5. Dubey et al. (1989) point out the fact that in a framework with multiple goods, if an agent fails 
to deliver a certain good, there arises a problem regarding what prices should be considered for the 
remaining goods. The answer will depend on whether the defaulting agent has market power or not, or 
if the group of defaulters is so large that it affects market prices. LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48, No. 1 (MAY, 2011), 39–64
advantage of this assumption is acknowledged in many studies, 
such as Zame (1993), since it allows the demonstration of the 
existence of equilibrium with default without the need to impose 
credit constraints on agents.
Once the problem of the existence of equilibrium has been delimited, the 
following step revolves around its efficiency. It is known that the existence 
of complete markets is a sufficient condition for the existence of Pareto 
optimality, while in the case of incomplete markets one can only refer 
to limited Pareto optimality (Mas-Collel et al., 1995, chapters 16 and 
19), generally with a lower degree of efficiency. If the number of assets 
is lower than the possible states of nature in the future, efficiency can 
always be lower than the corresponding efficiency of complete markets. 
It is important to note that the incorporation of new markets does not 
necessarily increase efficiency when they are incomplete, and may even 
worsen it (Hart, 1975, example 4). In fact, if all the “markets needed 
for completion minus one” are incorporated, it is possible that in these 
new markets no transactions will be generated, maintaining the degree 
of efficiency unchanged. When there is the possibility of default, the 
resulting number of actively traded assets is lower than the number of 
tradeable ones because in default the sale of an asset is not necessarily 
the opposite of its purchase. The buyer only receives what is delivered 
to her and the seller also suffers a punishment for what is not delivered. 
Thus, the relationship between the marginal utility of the purchase and 
the marginal disutility of the sale can be related to a transaction cost. 
Assets with returns higher than this cost will be traded, while the rest 
will not (Dubey et al., 2005). Thus, in equilibrium, a given market may 
open, but agents simply will not participate in it. The main result of 
Zame (1993) is, precisely, that the combination of incorporation of new 
markets with the possibility of default is what enables an improvement 
in the efficiency of the economy.
1.3. Work plan
After this introduction, the following section contains a review of 
the original DGS model, which assumes the existence of a single 
consumption good. We will immediately define the GEIλ
 equilibrium, 
whose properties will be examined in Section 3.
In Section 4, we will concentrate on equilibria in which consumption 
is not null in all states. First, we will study the comparisons made by  E.A. Rodríguez | DEFAUlT IN ECoNoMIES WITH INCoMPlETE MARKETS
the agent in her exercise of optimization. Then we will analyze the 
connection in equilibrium between degrees of punishment, perception 
of fulfillment and promised returns with the final position of the agents 
in a specific asset.
In Section 5, we will assume that agents can be classified into two 
homogenous types, which will enable us to model their actions through 
representative agents. In that section, we will study some properties 
which arise when an agent belonging to a certain group sells an Arrow 
asset to an agent of the other group and the resulting relationship 
between the degree of punishment perceived by the issuer of an asset 
and the level of consumption of both types of agents. Section 6 will 
present the conclusions.
2. The DGS model
Let’s assume a two-period economy with uncertainty. In period 0, H 
agents trade J assets and a single consumption good. Nature chooses 
one of the S possible states, which occurs in period 1. All the assets 
pay on the consumption good in period 1. Following are details on 
the notation used:
  s ∈ S*={0}∪S, S ={1,...,S  }= set of states of nature;
  h ∈ H ={1,...,H  }= set of traders;
  eh ∈ RS
+
*= initial endowments of h. The consumption good is 
in positive aggregate supply, in other words es =Σh∈H es
h > 0  
for all s ∈ S  *;
  uh : RS
+
*→R, a utility function on consumption which is smooth, 
concave and strictly increasing in each of the S* states;
  j ∈ J ={1,...,J  }= set of assets;
  A = [Asj ]∈ RS
+




= default punishment by unit of good on the asset j defaulted 
by agent h in state s.
To define equilibrium, we consider the macro variables p -, p - and K
-
 that 
each agent perceives. Thus p - ∈ RS
+
*
+ is the vector of the commodity 
prices, p - ∈ RJ
+ is the vector of asset prices and K
-
 = [Ksj ]∈ RS ×J  is a 
matrix with entries Ksj ∈ [0,1] for all (s,j  )∈ S ×J which represents the 
fraction delivered of payments promised by asset j in state s. LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48, No. 1 (MAY, 2011), 39–64
The budget set Bh(p -, p -, K
-
) of agent h is given by:
B p x D
p x e
h S J J S J
h
( , , ) {( , , , ) :
( ) ( )
* p θ ϕ
p θ ϕ
K = ∈ × × ×
- + - =
+ + + +
× R R R R
0 0 0 0 0,
( ) , } p x e D K A s S s s s
h
sj sj sj j j j - + ≤ ∀ ∈ ∑ ∑ θ  
where x ∈ RS
+
* is the bundle of goods, θ, ϕ ∈ R+
J represent the purchases 
and sales, respectively, of the J assets and Dsj is the total amount 
effectively delivered by j in s.
The payout of (x, θ, ϕ, D) in Bh(p -, p -, K
-
) for agent h is:
wh (x, θ, ϕ, D) = uh(x)-ΣjΣs λs
h
j max{0, Asj ϕj -Dsj}.
where max{0, Asj ϕj -Dsj} is the default of h on her promise to deliver 
on asset j in state s. Thus, it is assumed that the punishment is linear 
and separable in the total defaulted amount.







[Eq. 0] p -
s = 1 for all s ∈ S*
[Eq. 1] (x -h, θ
-h, ϕ
-h, D
-h)∈ arg max wh (x,θ,ϕ,D) on Bh (p -, p -, K
-
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Condition 0 is just a normalization of prices. Condition 1 indicates 
that agents must optimize in equilibrium, given the levels of the 
macro variables. Conditions 2 and 3 require that the goods and assets 
markets clear.
Condition 4 says that in equilibrium the repayment of each asset must 
be equal to what all its issuers effectively pay. It is worth emphasizing 
that, in line with the assumption of perfect competition, each potential 
buyer of an asset j expects that the default against her will be a 
proportion of the promised values which is determined by the market 
and not by her choice of θj
h.
Condition 5 considers the situation in which there is no exchange 
of asset j in equilibrium. In this case, potential lenders do not have 
market signals on which to base their expectations of default, which 
is why it is necessary to specify the conjectures they will make so that 
they are not inconsistent with the incentives the agents will have in 
equilibrium. This condition indicates that the lender’s conjecture is 
such that she rationally anticipates that borrowers will not pay back 
anything if their default punishments are sufficiently low, and they 
will pay back in full if the punishments are sufficiently harsh.
3.  Characterization of equilibrium
Let’s consider the case proposed originally by Dubey et al. (1989), in 
which it is assumed that wh (x, θ, ϕ, D) is quasilinear. In this case, 
the linear term is the amount of the punishment experienced by the 
agent, which is linear with respect to the total defaulted. Since it is 
assumed that in this economy there is a single good, the only variable  LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48, No. 1 (MAY, 2011), 39–64
prices are those of assets. For simplicity, we will use a utility function 
for the consumption separable among states.
Under these assumptions, the problem of agent h is the following:
Problem P:
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R R R R


















A D max , 0
1 1
subject to 
















0 0 1 0 - + - =
- +








K A s S ≤ ∀ ∈


        = = ∑ ∑ θ  
1 1
where we have assumed that p -
s = 1  for all s ∈ S* and γs represents 
the probability of occurrence of state s in period 1 viewed from 0.
We know that if the columns of the returns matrix A = [Asj] ∈ R+
S ×J, 
J < S, are linearly independent, then there is GEIλ equilibrium for 
any vector l >> 0 (Dubey et al., 1989, pages 14-19) and therefore a 
solution to the agent h’s optimization problem.
Clearly, when agent h’s utility function uh is strictly increasing in 
future states, all budget constraints are active in the optimum. It also 
follows that the equilibrium condition in markets for goods and assets 
ensures that this situation is verified for all agents in the economy.





j generates disadvantages when trying to apply the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions to study the properties of optimal individual 
decision in equilibrium. Indeed, unless the agent defaults (or pays 
more than what is owed) in each one of the states, the optimum will 
occur precisely at one of the points of non-differentiability of wh. In 
this sense, the following two propositions taken together formally 
show that the optimization originally posed by Dubey et al. (1989) is 
equivalent to the problem in which it is assumed that the agents are 
rewarded for making payments higher than they committed to, but 
they are unable to do so. Thus, this simple observation enables us to  E.A. Rodríguez | DEFAUlT IN ECoNoMIES WITH INCoMPlETE MARKETS
redefine the problem of consumer optimization such that the objective 
function is differentiable in its entire domain. Therefore, the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions are applicable for studying its properties.
Proposition 1. Let (x*,θ*,ϕ*,D*) be an equilibrium and uh be a 
strictly increasing function in xs





all (s, j)∈ S × J; in other words, in no future state will agent h pay 
amounts higher than those promised for the sale of an asset.
Proof: Let’s assume that this is not true, so that in the optimum there 




* > As ˜j ˜ϕh
j ˜
*. Being an optimum, a 
change in Dh
s ˜j ˜ which verifies the budget constraint for state s ˜ should not 
generate an increase in wh.
We propose the vector (x**,θ*,ϕ*,D**), which only differs from the original 
optimum in the Dh
s ˜j ˜ and xh
s ˜ variables by an infinitesimal magnitude e > 0; 








* + e . It must be noted that 
these new values also satisfy the budget constraint in s ˜, the only one in 
which both variables appear, so (x**,θ*,ϕ*,D**) is also an admissible vector 
of the problem. The impact of this change on Dh
s ˜j ˜  and xh
s ˜ on the utility of 
agent h can be analyzed in three parts:
1.  On the utility of present consumption: x0
h* can only vary if any other 
variable of the budget constraint in s = 0 also does. Since xh
s ˜ and Dh
s ˜j ˜ 
do not appear in it, and as we have maintained θj
h  and ϕj
h constant, 
then the utility of present consumption is not changed by the passage 
of (x*,θ*,ϕ*,D*) to (x**,θ*,ϕ*,D**).
2.  On the utility of future consumption:
a)  If s ≠ s ˜: xh
s * can only vary if some variable of the corresponding budget 
constraint also does. As this does not occur, there is no change in the 
utility of future consumption in those states.








*), the left side of the budget 
constraint of state s ˜ remains unchanged. As a result of the increasing 




** increases the utility of 
future consumption in state s ˜.
3.  On the disutility of punishment: Because As ˜j ˜ϕh
j ˜  - Dh
s ˜j ˜  < 0 is verified at both 
points, the amount of the punishment remains unaltered by the change 
and, therefore, so does the disutility for punishment of agent h.
Then (x**,θ*,ϕ*,D**) generates for h a total utility greater than (x*,θ*,ϕ*,D*), 
with which the latter cannot be an optimum of h.
 
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which differs from problem P in the function of punishment, the equality 
of the budget constraints in states s ∈ S and in the incorporation of the 
non-negativity constraints of Asjϕj - Dsj. Thus, while in the original 
problem the agent does not receive any reward for paying more than 
her obligations, in this new problem she would receive a reward but 
is unable to pay more.
At the same time, consider Problem P whith equality in all budget 
constraints. Let’s call this modified problem Problem P*. For 
application of Proposition 1, if (x*,θ*,ϕ*,D*) is optimal in P*, then 
it is also optimal in P’. The following proposition shows that the 
reciprocal is also true.
Proposition 2. If (x*,θ*,ϕ*,D*) is optimal in P’, then it also is in P*.
Proof: Let there be sets:
C x D B p




sj j sj sj j j
= ∈
- + = ∀ ∈ ∑ ∑







D A s j S J





= ∈ × × ×
- ≤ ∀ ∈ ×
+ + + +
× {( , , , ) :
( , ) }.
* θ ϕ
ϕ
R R R R
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By construction we know that wh = w ˜h for all (x,θ,ϕ,D) ∈ (C ∩ M). As 
(x*,θ*,ϕ*,D*) ∈ (C ∩ M) is optimal in P’, for all (x,θ,ϕ,D) ∈ (C ∩ M) it 
is true that:
max ( , , , ) ( , , , ) max .




h w w x D w x D w
∩ ∩
= = =   θ ϕ θ ϕ




h w w =
∩
 Let’s assume that it is not 
true, then the optimum in P* should belong to (C ∼ M). However, this 
contradicts the result of Proposition 1 which requires that the optimum 
in P* belong to (C ∩ M). Thus (x*,θ*,ϕ*,D*) is optimal in P*.

Thus, unlike the original problem, Problem P’ has the advantage that 
it can be addressed through the (necessary) Kuhn-Tucker conditions. 
This is true given that the new objective function is differentiable in 
its entire domain and the constraints are all linear, with which the 
constraint qualification is always verified in the optimum.
Let hi
h, i ∈ S*, and δs
h
j , (s, j)∈ S × J, be the Lagrange multipliers of 
the budget constraints and constraints Ds
h
j - Asj ≤ 0, respectively. 
The following is satisfied in the optimum:
uh′(x0
h*) ≤ h0
h, with equality if x0
h* > 0;  (1)
γsuh′(xs
h*) ≤ hs
h for all s ∈ S, with equality if xs
h* > 0;  (2)








1 0  for all j ∈ J, with equality if θj
* > 0; (3)




j A - ≥
= ∑ 1 0  for all j ∈ J, with equality if ϕj
*> 0; (4)
hs
h ≥ λsj - δs
h
j for all (s, j)∈ S × J , with equality if D*
sj > 0; (5)
( ) ( ) ,








0 0 1 0 - + - =
= ∑ p θ ϕ
 
h0
h ≥ 0;  (6)
( )













= = ∑ ∑ θ
1 1 , hs
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Thus, through application of Proposition 2, all optimum points of 
problem P which satisfy with equality all of the budget constraints 
verify conditions (1) to (8).
6
It is evident that the formulation of problem P through conditions 
(1) to (8) involves the incorporation of the variables δs
h
j. To interpret 








j (equal to zero in P’) represents the maximum 
amount that h is permitted to pay in state s above the obligations 
assumed with the sale of asset j. Thus, δs
h
j indicates the increase in 
h’s maximum utility as a consequence of an increase in the maximum 
amount allowed for paying j in s. In terms of the original problem P, 
these new constraints would imply a utility function equal to:























= ∑   ( ) ( )
max ,
0 1γ
λ z ϕ   
  








 indicates the amount by which h’s maximum utility 
would increase if the punishment for default of j in s began to operate 
at levels greater than zs
h
j (equal to zero in P*).
It is evident that for two equally priced assets, agent h will prefer to 
default the one with a lower punishment. The next two propositions show 
that this situation is also verified for all equilibrium prices vectors.
Proposition 3. If in a state s′ ∈ S the punishments λs′j differ among the 
different assets, in other words λs′j′ ≠ λs′j′′ when j′ ≠ j′′, in equilibrium 
the agent h will partially default at most one asset in s′.
Proof: Suppose that in equilibrium agent h partially defaults on 
assets j′ and j′′ in state s′ ∈ S. From Condition (5) we know that 
hs
h
′ = λs′j′ - δh
s′j′ = λs′j′′ - δh
s′j′′ , which through application of Condition 
(8) implies hs
h
′ = λs′j′ = λs′j′′. Therefore, the punishments are different.

It is also evident in equilibrium that if agent h, seller of assets j′ and 
j′′ with λs′j′′ < λs′j′, defaults j′ partially in state s′, then j′′ should 
6. Note that with default of j at s, δsj must be equal to 0, while with fulfillment δsj can be 0 or have 
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not be totally fulfilled in the same state; otherwise h could increase 
her utility by increasing the degree of fulfillment of j′ at the cost of 
defaulting on j′′ by an equal amount. Therefore, from Proposition 3, 
the default of j′′ in s′ should be total.
Proposition 4. Let j′ and j′′ be two assets that agent h defaults in 
equilibrium in state s′. If the default of j′ is total and λs′j′′ < λs′j′, the 
default of j′′ is also total.
Proof: We will demonstrate that there cannot be total default of j′ and 
partial default of j′′ with punishments λs′j′′ < λs′j′. Since j′ is totally 
defaulted, from (5) and (8) we have hs
h
′ ≥ λs′j′, while from the partial 
default of j′′ it follows that hs
h
′ = λs′j′′ < λs′j′, where the inequality is by 
hypothesis. Both expressions cannot be true simultaneously.

Thus, if in s′ agent h totally defaults jD, from Proposition 4 it follows 
that the same will occur with all assets with default punishments 
lower than jD. In addition, we know that if h partially defaults j°, 
all assets j where λs′j° < λs′j cannot be defaulted; otherwise, for 
these assets j either Proposition 3 (if the default of j is partial) 
or Proposition 4 (if the default is total) would be violated. Thus, 
if in equilibrium h partially defaults j° it is also proven that for   
λs′1<...<λs′(j°-1)<λs′j°<λs′(j°+1)<...<λs′J, the assets j ∈ {1,...,j° - 1} 
will be totally defaulted, while in the remaining j ∈ {j°+ 1,...,J} there 
will be no default whatsoever in s′.
4.  Interpretation of the results
We will now focus on the case in which the solution is positive both 
in the consumption variables xs, s ∈ S, as well as the multipliers 




h > 0;  (9)
γsuh′(xs
h) = hs
h > 0 ∀s ∈ S;  (10)
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Note that in this last formula (1-Ksj) is the non-delivered fraction 
of the payments promised for asset j in state s, such that Asj (1-Ksj) 
is the total default amount on the payment of these returns. Thus, 
(16) indicates that, in equilibrium, the personal valuation expected 
of the default amount on the payment of returns of asset j must be 
non-negative.
With respect to how the agent uses asset price information, it is evident 
that she makes two types of comparisons when deciding: one as a buyer 
and the other as a seller. If the agent is considering buying a given 
asset, inequality (14) will become an equality so the asset price must 
be equal to her expected valuation7 of the portion of returns that the 
asset will effectively pay out; in other words, considering a possible 
default situation.8 On the other hand, as a seller, the price must not 
be higher than her expected valuation of the total returns promised 
by the asset,9 regardless of its effective fulfullment.
7. The term “expected” in this context refers only to the different states of nature, not to the ex-
pected default.
8. Note that in the mentioned equation Asj is always multiplied by its respective Ksj. If Ksj = 0 for all 
s ∈ S, that is total default in all states, the asset price for the buyer is zero because that is her personal 
valuation of the returns on that asset.
9. Unlike what occurs in (14), equality in Equation (15) is only ensured if the agent defaults on the 
asset in all future states. E.A. Rodríguez | DEFAUlT IN ECoNoMIES WITH INCoMPlETE MARKETS
In summary, there is a difference in the valuation of the asset by the 
buyer and the seller when it is partially defaulted even though the 
expected delivery amount is known in equilibrium by both parties. 
However, in equilibrium, the price will ultimately be determined 
by the buyer regardless of the promises and personal valuations of 
the seller.
In terms of purchase and sale of assets, given a vector of punishments   
l ˜ and matrices K ˜ and A ˜, conditions (11) and (12) say that, in the 
optimum, agent i:
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cannot be equilibrium prices since conditions (11) and (12) do not 
allow that.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the quantities traded of 
an asset j and its price for a given vector (x*,D*,δ*). Because of the 
aforementioned, prices above p ˜j
V and below p ˜j
C 
 
cannot be equilibrium 
prices because they violate conditions (11) and (12) of agent i (shaded 
area). Only those points contained in the thick dotted line correspond 
to optimum traded levels at the price p ˜j
V ∈ [p ˜j
C, p ˜j
V ]. Thus, the graph 
shows that if i is the seller (ϕj > 0) she will not deliver asset j for a 
price lower than p ˜j
V (region I), since the punishment and/or promised 
return are not sufficiently low. On the other hand, if i is the buyer 
(θj > 0), she will not acquire the asset for a price higher than p ˜j
C 
(region II) since the degree of fulfillment and/or the promised return 
are not high enough. LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48, No. 1 (MAY, 2011), 39–64
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From the interaction of two agents f and g we can have, among others, 
the following cases:
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In case A the equilibrium cannot be with asset transaction, since the 
price that f demands for the sale is higher than what g is willing to 
pay, while the amount f wants to pay for the purchase is much lower 
than what g is willing to give her. In this case, the punishment and 
return are not sufficiently low for one of the agents and the expected 
payment is not high enough for the other agent, so the transaction 
is not carried out.
Case B shows that while the price asked by f for the sale is higher 
than what g would be willing to pay for the asset, the same would 
not occur if f is the one who wants to buy and g is the one who wants 
to sell. Thus, since for f the price is in accordance with the degree 
of fulfillment and the payout promised by the asset, while for g the 
same is true both in terms of the punishment and the commitment 
taken on, the transaction occurs. Case C is similar, but f and g 
exchange roles.
5.  GEIλ economies with two homogeneous types
In this section we will assume that agents can be classified as one of 
two homogenous types, represented by agent I or agent II, depending 
on the group they belong to. Thus, we will analyze what occurs in 
equilibrium when one of the agents sells an asset to another agent.
We will concentrate on the relationship between an asset’s degree of 
fulfillment, punishment and (positive) consumption of equilibrium of 
the agents. In this sense, let’s assume that agent k sells to h an Arrow 
asset j* with positive payout promised in state s -. On the side of agent 
h (buyer) from conditions (11) and (13) it follows that:
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In regard to agent k (seller), from Condition (4) we have:
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and depending on her position with respect to the payout in s -, 
recalling conditions (5) and (8), it is inferred that in the optimum 
agent k will satisfy:
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Regardless of the behavior of k, from equations (17) and (19) the 
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Depending on the degree of asset fulfillment, we will have the 
following:
a)  If asset j* is partially, but not totally, defaulted in state s -, 
we know that 0 < Ks -j * < 1, and from (24) and recalling that 
hk
s - = λs -j * and δk
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=   (26)
Note that, given the concavity of the utility functions of k and h, 
Equation (26) indicates the existence of a decreasing relationship between 
punishment and consumption for a given level of default Ks -j *.
Equation (26) also says that, in equilibrium, the personal valuations 
of greater default on asset j* in state s - must be equal for the buyer 
and the seller. For this purpose, keeping in mind that λs -j * represents 
seller k’s marginal disutility for defaulting on j* in state s -, the left 
side of (26) measures the value k assigns to the punishment for a 
marginal default on j* in s - in terms of marginal consumption utility 
in period 0. Recalling that the price of consumer good x is equal to 1, 
note that if this ratio were less than one, agent k would value greater 
consumption at 0 more than the disutility she would experience for 
an increased default on j* in s -. If this were to occur, k would have 
incentives to increase the degree of default on this asset in order to 
use those resources to finance greater present consumption. On the 
other hand, if this ratio were greater than 1, k would tend to reduce 
her present consumption and use the resources to fulfill a greater 
portion of her payments on j*. According to (26) this punishment-
utility ratio should be equal to buyer h’s personal valuation of the 
degree of fulfillment of this asset (right side of the equation).
Note that as in equilibrium agent k verifies hk
s - = λs -j * through 
application of conditions (5) and (8), Equation (26) can be written as   
(hk
s -/hk
0 ) = (hh
s -/hh
0 )Ks -j * , indicating that the ratio between the 
intertemporal marginal rates of substitution in consumption between 
seller k and buyer h must be equal to the degree of fulfillment of 
asset j*; in other words, the seller’s personal expected valuation of 
what she promises to pay for the sale of j* must be equal to the 
buyer’s personal valuation of what she expects to receive from k as 
payment from this asset.0 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48, No. 1 (MAY, 2011), 39–64
b)  If there is no default in state s -, because k is the only issuer of 
the asset it is verified that Ks -j * = 1, with which, recalling that 
hk




















* *      (27)






















0    (28)
for all 0 < K ˜
s -j * < 1. Thus, expression (28) shows that for consumption 
levels similar to those in case a), the punishment λs -
D
j*
P is not sufficient 
for the inexistence of default on the asset j’ in state s -. In fact, at 
punishment levels λs -
D
j*
P, seller k will always have incentives to increase 
her consumption, financed by greater default on j’.
c)  If k, the only issuer of j*, totally defaults in s -, then Ks -j * = 0 10, 
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* * = =
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and remembering that δk
s -j* = 0, λs -
D
j*
T must be equal to 0.
From the previous analysis, it can be seen that both situations of total 
fulfillment and default are compatible in equilibrium with finite rates 
of punishment. Clearly, equilibrium with partial default is compatible 
with a lower punishment than that which would correspond to total 
fulfillment. Equilibrium with total default is a different case, only 
compatible with null punishment, since a relationship cannot be 
established a priori between the intertemporal marginal rates of 
substitution of the agents, as can be done under total fulfillment 
or partial default. It is worth noting that for economies with three 
homogeneous types of agents, if two of them are issuers and only one 
of them totally defaults in s -, then we will have Ks -j* < 1, which brings 
us to a situation similar to a), since in the latter case the asset j*, in 
the aggregate, is partially defaulted.
10. This is not necessarily the case when there are more than two agents, as will be clarified later.1 E.A. Rodríguez | DEFAUlT IN ECoNoMIES WITH INCoMPlETE MARKETS
6.  Conclusions and possible extensions
In this paper we have studied some properties of GEIλ equilibrium 
in a two-period economy with incomplete markets in which default 
is allowed.
The proposed characterization of equilibrium showed how an agent 
determines her participation in the credit market. In this sense, we 
observed that as a buyer, the agent will compare the market price with 
her personal expected valuation of the total effective returns on the 
asset. On the other hand, as a seller, the agent will only consider what 
the asset promises, regardless of whether the payments are made.
Second, we concentrated on the trade of assets, stressing the relationship 
in equilibrium between degrees of punishment, perception of fulfillment, 
promised returns and final position in a certain asset. In the first place, 
if the economy's assets have different punishments in a given state, the 
maximum number of partially defaulted assets in equilibrium in that 
state is equal to one. In this sense, it was also shown that all assets 
with punishment lower than that are totally defaulted; the rest, those 
with a greater punishment, are fulfilled. With respect to asset prices 
in equilibrium, if there is trade the prices will be equal to the buyer's 
personal valuation of the returns she expects to receive from each one 
of them, regardless of their promised payments. For the buyer, this 
price is low enough to assume the risk of default which the purchase 
of the asset implies, while for the seller it is high enough to take the 
risk of facing a harsh punishment in the bad state.
Finally, we discussed the particular case of economies with two 
homogeneous types of agents, a buyer and a seller of a given asset. 
In this sense, we explored the behavior of consumption in a state in 
which an Arrow asset is defaulted. It is evident that, at least in this 
case, finite rates of punishment are compatible with degrees of partial 
and total fulfillment. We have also observed that, in equilibrium, when 
the default is partial the personal valuations of the degree of default 
of the asset must be equal for both the buyer and the seller. Thus, the 
buyer’s personal valuation of what the asset is expected to pay must 
be equal to the ratio between the marginal disutility the seller would 
experience if an asset is marginally defaulted and its improvement in 
terms of utility generated by greater present consumption.
The analysis of equilibrium in this paper has focused on the search for 
qualitative conclusions. However, the proposed characterization of the  LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48, No. 1 (MAY, 2011), 39–64
optimal decision of agents in equilibrium would enable an extension 
of the analysis to the quantitative field, which implies simulation 
exercises. In this sense, for the computational effort required to be 
worthwhile in terms of explaining what is observed in the real world, 
an interesting contribution would be to extend the analysis of this 
paper to economies with more than two periods.
However, such an extension is not immediate, as complications begin 
to arise which cannot be ignored when analyzing the evolution of this 
type of economy over time.
In the first place, the assumption of the existence of a single consumption 
good must be eliminated, which implies a considerable increase in 
the dimensionality of the system of equations to be solved. In the 
framework of a two-period economy, such an assumption did not imply 
too many complications because the analysis did not take into account 
the possibility of goods exchange in the future period. However, when 
more than two periods are considered, the assumption of non-exchange 
of goods in intermediate periods is economically unsustainable, so 
it is essential to incorporate more goods into the analysis. Likewise, 
the introduction of more consumption goods necessarily requires 
the inclusion of explicit credit constraint mechanisms to ensure the 
existence of equilibrium (Dubey et al., 2005).
In this sense, a way to introduce these kinds of constraints is the 
requirement that a borrower provide collateral. This mechanism, 
analyzed in Zame and Geanakoplos (2000) for the two-period case 
as well as in Orillo (2001a, 2001b), Araujo et al. (2002) and Páscoa 
and Seguir (2009) for infinite periods, constitutes an alternative to 
the introduction of exogenous transversality conditions which tend to 
prevent the possibility of Ponzi schemes. It is important to point out 
that a good which acts as collateral should not be only considered 
as a requirement for obtaining a loan, but also as a durable good, 
which likewise implies including in the analysis the utility that 
this good generates for the agent who has it in custody (Zame and 
Geanakoplos, 2000).
On the other hand, the issue of reputation is another factor which 
must be considered in this kind of extension. It is to be expected 
that defaulting agents, in addition to being subject to confiscations 
or other types of punishments, are restricted from participating in 
the credit market for a certain period of time. Also, in the event of  E.A. Rodríguez | DEFAUlT IN ECoNoMIES WITH INCoMPlETE MARKETS
default, the possibility of renegotiation of the defaulted debt should 
also be taken into account.
As can be seen, the extension of the DGS model to more than two 
periods invites treatment of a series of very interesting topics regarding 
the functioning of financial markets today, which go beyond the 
objectives of this paper. LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48, No. 1 (MAY, 2011), 39–64
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